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I
n recent years, policymakers in the Basel countries have begun exploring
strategies for harnessing ﬁnancial markets to contain bank risk. Indeed,
the new Accord counts market discipline, along with supervisory review
and capital requirements, as an explicit pillar of bank supervision.1 A pop-
ular proposal for implementing market discipline in the United States would
require large banks to issue a standardized form of subordinated debt (Board
of Governors 1999; Board of Governors 2000; Meyer 2001). Advocates of
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1 The cornerstone of supervisory review—the most important of the pillars—is thorough, reg-
ularly scheduled, on-site examinations. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA) requires most U.S. banks to submit to a full-scope examination every 12
months. These examinations focus on six components of safety and soundness—capital protection
(C), asset quality (A), management competence (M), earnings strength (E), liquidity risk exposure
(L), and market risk sensitivity (S)—CAMELS. At the close of each exam, an integer ranging
from 1 (best) through 5 (worst) is awarded for each component. Supervisors then use these com-
ponent ratings to assign a composite CAMELS rating reﬂecting overall condition—also on a 1-to-5
scale. In general, banks with composite ratings of 1 or 2 are considered satisfactory while banks
with ratings of 3, 4, or 5 are unsatisfactory and subject to supervisory sanctions. (Footnote 10
offers more details about these sanctions.) At year-end 2005, 4.63 percent of U.S. banks held
unsatisfactory ratings.
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this proposal argue that high-powered performance incentives in the subordi-
nated debt (sub-debt) market will produce accurate risk assessments. And, in
turn, these assessments—expressed for risky institutions through rising yields
or difﬁculties rolling over maturing debt—will pressure bank managers to
maintain safety and soundness (Calomiris 1999; Lang and Robertson 2002).
Even if ﬁnancial markets apply little direct pressure to curb risk tak-
ing, market data could still enhance supervisory review by improving off-
site surveillance.2 Off-site surveillance involves the use of accounting data
and anecdotal evidence to monitor the condition of supervised institutions
between scheduled exams.3 Market assessments could enhance surveillance
in three ways: (1) by ﬂagging banks missed by conventional off-site tools,
(2) by reducing uncertainty about banks ﬂagged by other tools, or (3) by pro-
viding earlier warning about developing problems in banks ﬂagged by these
tools (Flannery 2001). Such enhancements would reduce failures over time
by enabling supervisors to take action earlier to address safety-and-soundness
problems.
Oneconcernaboutattemptstoincorporatemarketdataintosurveillanceis
regulatory burden—current proposals would require large banking organiza-
tionstoﬂoatastandardizedissueofsub-debt. Thatmostlargebankscurrently
issue sub-debt does not imply the burden is negligible.4 Voluntary issuance
varies considerably over time with market conditions. For example, the num-
berofsub-debtissuesbythetop-50bankingorganizationsrosefrom3in1988
to 108 in 1995, only to fall to 42 in 1999 (Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast 2002).
Moreover, banks currently issuing sub-debt may be choosing maturities un-
likely to produce valuable risk signals, so a mandated maturity would still
impose a regulatory burden. Before placing additional burden on the banking
sector, particularly at a time when other sizable regulatory changes (Basel II)
are in the ofﬁng, supervisors should ﬁrst assess the power of risk signals from
existing securities.
Onepotentialsourceofriskassessmentsthatcanbeminedwithoutincreas-
ing regulatory burden is the market for jumbo certiﬁcates of deposit (CDs).
2 Bliss and Flannery (2001) found that managers of holding companies do not respond to
market pressure to contain risk, though Rajan (2001) questioned the ability of their framework to
unearth such evidence.
3 Examination is the most effective tool for spotting safety-and-soundness problems, but it is
costly and burdensome—costly because of the examiner resources required and burdensome because
of the intrusion into bank operations. Surveillance reduces the need for unscheduled visits by
prodding bankers to contain risk between scheduled exams. It also helps supervisors plan exams
by highlighting risk exposures. For example, if pre-exam surveillance reports indicate a bank has
signiﬁcant exposure to interest rate ﬂuctuations, supervisors will staff the exam team with additional
market risk expertise.
4 Mandating issuance of a security with speciﬁc attributes is tantamount to a tax on capital
structure. Although we know of no direct evidence about the burden of this tax, heterogeneity in
sub-debt maturities, outstanding volume over time, and the source of issue (bank vs. bank holding
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Jumbo CDs are time deposits with balances exceeding $100,000. The typical
bank relies on a mix of deposits to fund assets—checkable deposits, passbook
savings accounts, retail CDs, and jumbo CDs. Both retail and jumbo CDs
have ﬁxed maturities (as opposed to checkable deposits which are payable
on demand); they differ by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
coverage. Only the ﬁrst $100,000 of deposits is eligible for insurance, so the
entire retail CD (which is less than $100,000) is insured while only the ﬁrst
$100,000 of a jumbo CD is covered. Checkable deposits, passbook savings,
and retail CDs are often collectively referred to as “core deposits” because
balances respond little to changes in bank condition and market rates. Full
FDIC coverage makes these deposits a stable and cheap source of funding. At
year-end 2005, U.S. banks funded on average 67.1 percent of assets with core
deposits and 14.4 percent with jumbo CDs. The average jumbo CD balance
in the fourth quarter of 2005 was $330,886; the average balance in 95 percent
of the U.S. banks exceeded $152,115. The average maturity was just over
one year. Jumbo CDs are considered a “volatile” liability because relatively
large uninsured balances and short maturities force issuing banks to match
yields (risk-free rates plus default premiums) available in the money market
or lose the funding. This pressure to “price” new conditions quickly makes
the jumbo CD market, in theory, an important source of feedback for off-site
surveillance.5
Potentially valuable jumbo CD data are currently available for most com-
mercial banks. In contrast, only very large banking organizations now issue
sub-debt. Theseorganizationsmaybethemostimportantfromasystemic-risk
standpoint, but the focus of off-site surveillance—indeed of all U.S. pruden-
tial supervision—is on the bank, and most banks do not issue or belong to
holding companies that issue sub-debt. Moreover, a negative risk signal from
a holding company claim would not, by itself, help supervisors identify the
troubled subsidiary. Jumbo CDs constitute a large class of direct claims on
both large and small banks. At year-end 2005, U.S. banks with more than
5 Since the early 1990s, ﬁnancial innovation has offered households a growing array of substi-
tutes for traditional bank deposits. As a result, the supply of core deposits has declined secularly,
forcing banks to turn to more volatile funding sources such as jumbo CDs. Between 1992 and
2005, for example, the average core deposit-to-total asset ratio for U.S. banks tumbled from 80.1
percent to 67.1 percent, while average jumbo CD dependence jumped from 7.5 percent to 14.4
percent of assets. Increasing reliance on jumbo CDs implies greater exposure to liquidity and
market risk—a bad outcome from the perspective of a bank supervisor. At the same time, the
$100,000 ceiling on deposit insurance makes jumbo CD holders savvier about bank risk than other
depositors. So the jumbo CD market could exert pressure on bank managers to contain risk—either
directly through the impact of higher yields and lower balances on proﬁts or indirectly through
supervisory responses to risk signals conveyed by yields and withdrawals. Such pressure would
complement supervisory review. Hence, another contribution of this article is to offer insight into
the tradeoff by quantifying the potential contribution of jumbo CD data to off-site surveillance. See
Feldman and Schmidt (1991) for further discussion of the tradeoff between greater risk exposure
and more reliable market data implied by rising jumbo CD dependence. Our results suggest this
rising dependence makes supervisors on balance worse off.138 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
$500 million in assets funded 14.6 percent of assets with jumbo CDs; for
banks with less than $500 million, the average jumbo-CD-to-total-asset ratio
was 14.3 percent. Finally, risk signals in the form of yields and withdrawals
can be cheaply and easily constructed because banks report jumbo CD inter-
est expense and balances quarterly to their principal supervisor. Also, nearly
30 years of research—much of which relies on these interest-expense and
account-balance data—has produced robust evidence of risk pricing in the
jumbo CD market.
Data from the jumbo CD market might prove particularly useful in
community bank surveillance. Community banks specialize in making loans
to and taking deposits from small towns or city suburbs. For regulatory pur-
poses, the Financial ModernizationAct of 1999 established an asset threshold
of$500million—expressedinconstant1999dollars. Atyear-end2005,nearly
90 percent of U.S. banks operated on this scale. Not surprisingly, most fail-
ures are community banks. They also frequently operate on extended exam
schedules, with up to 18 months elapsing between full-scope, on-site visits.
Thisschedulediminishesthequalityofquarterlyﬁnancialstatements, thereby
reducing the effectiveness of off-site monitoring.6 It is possible that holders
of community bank jumbo CDs supplement public ﬁnancial data with in-
dependent “Peter-Lynch-type” research.7 Or, inside information about bank
condition could leak from boards of directors, which typically include promi-
nent local businesspeople. (Community bank jumbo CDs are often held by
such “insiders.”) Thus, sudden changes in yields or withdrawals might sig-
nal trouble more quickly or reliably than surveillance tools based on ﬁnancial
statements.
In short, jumbo CDs fund a large portion of bank assets and furnish a
cheap source of market data, yet no study has formally tested the surveil-
lance value of yields and withdrawals. We do so with an early warning model
and out-of-sample timing conventions designed to mimic current surveillance
practices. Speciﬁcally, we generate risk rankings using jumbo CD default
premiums and quarter-over-quarter withdrawals for banks with satisfactory
supervisory ratings. We rank the same banks by CAMELS-downgrade prob-
ability as estimated by an econometric surveillance model. Finally, out-of-
sample performance for all three rankings is compared over a sequence of
two-year windows running from 1992 to 2005, counterfactually as if super-
6Veriﬁcation of ﬁnancials is an important source of value created by exams (Berger and
Davies 1998; Flannery and Houston 1999). Indeed, recent research has documented large ad-
justments in asset-quality measures following on-site visits, particularly for banks with emerging
problems (Gunther and Moore 2000).
7 Peter Lynch ran Fidelity’s Magellan Fund from 1977 to 1990. During this period, fund
value rose over 2,700 percent. Lynch was famous for looking past ﬁnancial statements to the real
world, observing consumer and ﬁrm behavior in malls, for example. For more details, see Lynch
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visors in the fourth quarter of each year possessed data only up to that point.
We ﬁnd that jumbo CD signals would not have ﬂagged banks missed by the
CAMELS-downgrade model or would not have reduced uncertainty about
banks ﬂagged by the model. We also ﬁnd that jumbo CD signals would not
have provided earlier warning about developing problems in banks ﬂagged by
the CAMELS-downgrade model. These results are broadly consistent with
other recent work, so we close by exploring reasons the surveillance value of
market data may have been overestimated.
1. PRIOR LITERATURE
Research on the jumbo CD market since the mid-1970s—mostly with 1980s
data—has consistently found evidence of risk pricing (see Table 1). Some 20
articles have been published using a mix of time series and panel approaches:
18 articles exploited U.S. data, 11 examined only yields, 4 examined only
runoff (i.e., deposit withdrawals), and 5 studied both. Most drew heavily on
quarterly ﬁnancial statements. Only one article—the ﬁrst contribution to the
literature in 1976—found no link between bank risk and yields or runoff. In
some ways, the robustness of these results is striking because U.S. samples
mostlypredatetheFederalDepositInsuranceCorporationImprovementActof
1991(FDICIA).BeforethisAct,themajorityoffailureswereresolvedthrough
purchases and assumptions, whereby the FDIC offered cash to healthy banks
to assume the liabilities of failed ones. So, even though jumbo CD holders
faced default risk in theory, many were shielded from losses in practice.8
Although evidence from prior literature about our out-of-sample test win-
dows (1992–2005) is thinner, intuition and history make a case for signif-
icant risk sensitivity. The handful of articles looking at 1990s data found
risk pricing, but no study examined jumbo CD data for the post-2000 pe-
riod. Nonetheless, economic intuition suggests sensitivity should be strong
because of three important institutional changes in the 1990s. First, as noted,
theFDICIAdirectedtheFDICtoresolvefailuresintheleastcostlyway,which
implies imposing a greater share of losses on uninsured bank creditors (Ben-
ston and Kaufman 1998; Kroszner and Strahan 2001).9 This change should
8 Before 1991, expected losses had three components: (1) the probability of bank failure,
(2) the loss if the failed bank were not purchased by a healthy one, and (3) the probability the
failed bank would not be purchased. Even if (1) and (2) were positive, expected losses would
still be approximately zero if jumbo CD holders expected all failures to be resolved with purchase
and assumptions. The need to model FDIC behavior, therefore, complicates estimation of risk
sensitivity for the pre-1991 regime. Suppose, for example, (1) and (2) fall, reducing expected
losses, incentives to monitor risk, and jumbo CD risk sensitivity. But the FDIC responds by
curtailing implicit coverage—perhaps because of the reduced threat of contagious runs. If large
enough, this offsetting effect could induce a rise in measured sensitivity to bank condition.
9As discussed in footnote 8, expected losses equal zero if jumbo CD holders anticipate
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have increased expected losses for jumbo CD holders and their incentive to
monitor bank condition. Second, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 required supervisors to disclose serious
enforcement actions (Gilbert and Vaughan 2001).10 Third, in the late 1990s,
the FDIC began putting quarterly ﬁnancial data for individual banks on the
Web, along with tools for comparing performance with industry peers. The
second and third change should have lowered the cost to jumbo CD holders of
monitoring bank condition. Evidence from U.S. banking history also implies
our sample should feature strong risk pricing. Gorton (1996), for example,
documented a link between discounts on state bank notes and issuer condi-
tion during the free-banking era, while Calomiris and Mason (1997) observed
sizable differences in yields and runoff for weak and strong Chicago banks
prior to the 1932 citywide panic. Friedman and Schwartz (1960) also noted
that public identiﬁcation of banks receiving loans from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation triggered runs in August 1932. More recently, Conti-
nental Illinois began hemorrhaging uninsured deposits when the extent of its
problemsbecamepublicinMay1984(Davison1997). Inallthesecases,unin-
sured claimants monitored and reacted to changes in bank condition, thereby
impounding risk assessments into prices or quantities.
Evidence of risk pricing in the jumbo CD market does not imply that
yield and runoff data would add value in surveillance. First, stable in-sample
estimates of reactions to current bank condition and reliable out-of-sample
forecasts of emerging safety-and-soundness problems are not the same thing.
Evidencefromthemarketefﬁciencyliterature, forexample, hasdemonstrated
that trading strategies based on well-documented pricing anomalies, such as
calendareffects, sizeeffects, andmeanrevision, donotofferabnormalreturns
whentestedinrealtimebyfundmanagers(Roll1994;Malkiel2003). Second,
justasassessingtheproﬁtabilityoftradingrulesrequiresabenchmark,suchas
the return from an index fund, assessing the surveillance value of market data
requires a baseline for current practices. It is not enough to note that jumbo
CD signals ﬂag problem banks because supervisors already have systems in
place for these purposes. The true litmus test is this: Does integration of
about FDIC behavior. Between 1988 and 1990, jumbo CD holders suffered losses in only 15
percent of bank failures. From 1993 to 1995, they lost money 82 percent of the time.
10 The term “enforcement action” refers to a broad range of powers used to address suspect
practices of depository institutions and institution-afﬁliated parties—the supervisory sanctions men-
tioned in footnote 1. Typically, these actions are imposed in response to adverse exam ﬁndings,
but they can also be triggered by deﬁcient capital levels under Prompt Corrective Action or by
negative information gathered through off-site surveillance. Usually enforcement actions are imple-
mented in a graduated manner, with informal preceding formal actions. An informal action is the
most common; it is simply a private, mutual understanding between a bank and its supervisory
agency about the steps needed to correct problems. Formal actions are far more serious. Super-
visors resort to them only when violations of law or regulations continue or when unsafe and
abusive practices occur. Formal enforcement actions are legally enforceable and, in most cases,
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yields and runoff into actual surveillance routines consistently and materially
improve out-of-sample forecast accuracy?11
Four recent articles have gauged the surveillance value of market data
againstacurrentpracticesbenchmark. EvanoffandWall(2001)comparedreg-
ulatory capital ratios and sub-debt yields as predictors of supervisory ratings,
ﬁndingthatsub-debtyieldsmodestlyoutperformcapitalratiosinone-quarter-
ahead tests. Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001), meanwhile, observed in-
sample improvement in model ﬁt when estimated default frequencies (EDFs,
as produced by Moody’s KMV) were included in an econometric model de-
signed to predict holding company supervisory ratings with accounting data.
Krainer and Lopez (2004) also experimented with equity market variables—
in this case, cumulative abnormal stock returns as well as EDFs—in a model
of holding company ratings. Unlike Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001),
they assessed value added in one-quarter-ahead forecasts. Like Evanoff and
Wall (2001), they noted only a modest improvement in out-of-sample perfor-
mance. Finally, Curry, Elmer, and Fissel (2003) added various equity signals
to an econometric model built to predict four-quarter-ahead supervisory rat-
ings, again witnessing only a slight increase in forecast accuracy.
Recent tests against a surveillance benchmark have advanced the market
data literature, to be sure, but the absence of empirical tests modeled on actual
practice mutes the potential impact on supervisory policy. Evanoff and Wall
(2001), for example, proxied supervisor perceptions of safety and soundness
withregulatorycapitalratios—apracticethatwasproblematicbecausecapital
isthesolecriteriononlywhenPromptCorrectiveAction(PCA)thresholdsare
violated. Otherwise, a variety of measures are weighed.12 In addition, Gun-
ther, Levonian, and Moore (2001) and Krainer and Lopez (2004) conducted
performance tests with holding company data—a problematic approach be-
cause, as noted, off-site surveillance focuses on individual banks. Indeed,
the Federal Reserve, which has responsibility for holding company supervi-
sion, does not maintain an econometric model estimated on holding company
data.13 Finally, Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001) and Curry, Elmer, and
Fissel(2003)reliedontestsunlikelytoimpresssupervisors: theﬁrstassessing
11As discussed in footnote 10, supervisors use enforcement actions to induce banks to address
safety-and-soundness problems. Some are quite severe, going as far as permanent removal from
the banking industry. The earlier actions are imposed, the more likely problems can be corrected.
But enforcement actions impose signiﬁcant costs on the bank, so supervisors prefer to wait for
compelling evidence of serious problems. Hence, jumbo CD signals could add supervisory value
by reinforcing conclusions yielded by other surveillance tools, thereby facilitating swifter action.
12 Footnote 1 discusses the CAMELS framework supervisors use to assess bank condition.
In any event, evidence from counterfactual applications of PCA to late 1980s/early 1990s data
(Jones and King 1995; Peek and Rosengren 1997) suggests the thresholds are too low to affect
supervisor behavior.
13 Each article estimated a unique holding company model to benchmark surveillance proce-
dures. Both tested joint hypotheses: (1) the model approximates the one the Fed would use and
(2) equity market signals enhance the performance of that model.142 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in-sample performance only and the second assessing out-of-sample perfor-
mance with a contemporaneous holdout (rather than a period-ahead sample).
Our work improves on this research by employing an econometric model
used in surveillance, out-of-sample timing conventions patterned on current
practices, and data taken from bank (rather than holding company) ﬁnancial
statements and supervisor assessments. Even more important, we contribute
a coherent framework for use in future research on the surveillance value of
market data.
2. THE DATA
To test the surveillance value of jumbo CD data, we built a long panel con-
taining ﬁnancial data and supervisory assessments for all U.S. commercial
banks. This data set contained income statement and balance sheet series as
well as CAMELS composite and management ratings from 1988:Q1 through
2005:Q4.14 The accounting data came from the Call Reports—formally the
Reports of Condition and Income—which are collected under the auspices of
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). The FFIEC
requires all U.S. commercial banks to submit such data quarterly to their prin-
cipal supervisor; most reported items are publicly available. CAMELS rat-
ings were pulled from a nonpublic portion of the National Information Center
database; only examiners, analysts, and economists involved in supervision at
the state or federal level can access these series. Only one substantive sample
restriction was imposed—exclusion of banks with operating histories of un-
der ﬁve years. Financial ratios for these start-up, or de novo, banks often take
extreme values that do not imply safety-and-soundness problems (DeYoung
1999). For instance, de novos often lose money in their early years, so earn-
ings ratios are poor. Extreme values could introduce considerable noise into
riskrankings,makingitmoredifﬁculttoassessrelativeperformance. Another
reason for dropping de novos is that supervisors already monitor these banks
closely. The Federal Reserve, for example, examines newly chartered banks
every six months until they earn a composite rating of 1 or 2 in consecutive
exams.
Although our testing framework improves on prior research, our data still
containmeasurementerror. Onlyasmallnumberofmoneycenterbanksissue
negotiable instruments that are actively traded, so true market yields are not
availableforacrosssectionoftheindustry. Itispossible,however,toconstruct
averageyieldsfromtheCallReportsforallU.S.banksbydividingquarterlyin-
14 Two data notes: (1) Explicit assessment of market risk sensitivity (S) was added in 1997,
so pre-1997 composites are CAMEL ratings, and (2) none of our empirical exercises exploits the
entire dataset (1988:Q1–2005:Q4); each uses a suitable sub-sample. For example, estimation of the
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terest expense by average balance. Subtracting rates on comparable-maturity
Treasuries from these yields produces something that looks like a default pre-
mium series. Other researchers have successfully tested hypotheses about
bank risk with this approach (for example, James 1988; Keeley 1990; and,
more recently, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler 2001). Still, two related types
of measurement error must be acknowledged; the proxy is an average rather
than marginal measure (and, therefore, somewhat backward looking), and it
is a quarterly accounting rather than real-time economic measure.
Measurement error in this series does not imply that jumbo CD data taken
from the Call Report lack surveillance value. Jumbo CD holders may react
to rising risk by withdrawing funds, and changes in account balances (deposit
runoff) can be measured error-free with accounting data.15 Moreover, distress
models based on ﬁnancial statements have been a cornerstone of public- and
private-sector surveillance for decades (Altman and Saunders 1997). Indeed,
federal and state supervisors alike give heavy weight to book-value measures
of credit risk and capital protection in routine surveillance, yet both contain
serious measurement error (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 1996; Reidhill and
O’Keefe 1997). Finally, and most importantly, the supervisory return on
jumbo CD signals—or any market signal for that matter—depends not on the
value of the signal alone, but rather on that value net of the cost of extraction.
Current surveillance routines are built around the Call Reports and, as noted,
these reports already contain the data necessary to construct yield and runoff
series for jumbo CDs. Even if the marginal surveillance value of jumbo CD
signalswerelowrelativetopuremarketsignalsbecauseofmeasurementerror,
the marginal cost of extracting jumbo CD signals is near zero. The cost of
integrating market signals into off-site surveillance is not as low because of
the regulatory burden associated with any compulsory security issues and the
trainingburdenassociatedwithchangesinsupervisorypractices. Itispossible,
therefore, that jumbo CD data add more net value than pure market signals.
In short, the surveillance value of jumbo CD data is ultimately an empirical
issue.
Still, the net contribution of jumbo CD signals to surveillance cannot be
positiveifmeasurementerrorrendersthedatahopelesslynoisy. So,asacheck,
we performed a simple test on yields and another on runoff—both suggested
that bank condition is priced. In the ﬁrst test, we compared quarterly yields—
that is, jumbo CD interest expense divided by average balance—for the 5
percent of banks most and least at risk of failure each year from 1992 to 2005
15 In the literature, “runoff” is used loosely as a synonym for withdrawals. For this test, we
deﬁne it as quarter-over-quarter percentage changes in a bank’s total dollar volume of jumbo CDs.
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(the period used in out-of-sample testing).16 Over this period, yields at high-
risk banks topped yields at low-risk banks by an average of 25 basis points.
(By way of comparison, the average spread between yields on three-month
nonﬁnancial commercial paper and three-month Treasury bills for 1992 to
2005 was 24 basis points.) Institutional changes in the 1990s appear to have
strengthened risk pricing. Despite declining money market rates, the mean
spread between “risky” and “safe” banks climbed from 14 basis points for
1992–1997 to 33 for 1998–2005 (difference signiﬁcant at 1 percent). In the
second test, we examined quarterly jumbo CD growth at the 169 U.S. banks
that failed between 1992 and 2005 for two distinct periods in the migration to
failure: two to four years out and zero to two years out. Mean growth two to
four years prior to failing was a healthy 8.4 percent. But in the ﬁnal two years,
quarterly growth turned sharply negative, averaging -4.0 percent—a pattern
consistent with jumbo CD holders withdrawing funds to avoid losses.
As a ﬁnal check, we regressed yields and runoff on failure probability and
suitable controls; the results also attested to risk pricing. The sample con-
tained observations for all non-de-novo banks with satisfactory supervisory
ratings from 1988:Q1 to 2004:Q4.17 (Table 2 contains the results.) Both co-
efﬁcients of interest were “correctly” signed and signiﬁcant at the 1-percent
level, implying a rise in failure risk translated into higher yields and larger
runoff: coefﬁcient magnitudes were economically small, but it is important
to remember that risk sensitivity is a cardinal concept whereas risk ranking is
an ordinal one. Recent back-testing of the Focus Report highlights the dif-
ference. The Focus Report is a Call-Report-based, Federal Reserve tool for
predicting the impact of a 200-basis-point interest rate shock on bank capital.
For the 1999–2002 interest rate cycle, Sierra andYeager (2004) found that es-
timates of bank losses were very noisy, but risk rankings based on these losses
were quite accurate. Our criterion for assessing jumbo CD data is analogous.
16 We estimated failure probabilities with the Risk-Rank model—one of two econometric
surveillance models used by the Federal Reserve. See footnote 18 for more discussion of this
model.
17 We controlled for factors suggested by academic literature, examiner interviews, and spec-
iﬁcation tests. These factors included term-to-maturity, the rate on Treasury securities with com-
parable maturities, economic conditions (dummies for quarters and states in the union), power in
local deposit markets (dummy for banks operating in an MSA), access to parent-company sup-
port (dummy for banks in holding companies), and demand for funding in excess of local supply
(dummy for banks with brokered deposits). The estimation sample included only satisfactory banks
to parallel the performance tests of downgrade probability and jumbo CD rankings. Conﬁning the
analysis to 1- and 2-rated banks may seem odd, akin to testing risk sensitivities of AA or better
corporate debt, but there are theoretical as well as practical justiﬁcations. Managers of nonregulated
ﬁrms operate with considerable latitude up to the point of bankruptcy. Bank managers, in contrast,
lose much of their discretion when an unsatisfactory rating is assigned. So market data for 3-,
4-, and 5-rated banks contain assessments of ongoing supervisory intervention as well as inherent
risk. Excluding unsatisfactory banks also produces more relevant evidence about the surveillance
value of market feedback. Supervisors continuously monitor these institutions, so market data are
unlikely to yield new information. But knowledge of deteriorating 1s and 2s would be valued
because these banks do not face constant scrutiny between exams.R.A. Gilbert,A. P. Meyer, and M. D. Vaughan: Jumbo CD Market 145
Surveillance value is measured not by the precision of estimated sensitivities
tobankrisk,butratherbytheimprovementinriskrankingstraceabletojumbo
CD yields and runoff.18
3. MARKETASSESSMENTS OF RISK: THE JUMBO CD
RANKINGS
The ﬁrst step in assessing the value of jumbo CD data was obtaining default
premiums for all sample banks with satisfactory supervisory ratings. We
created two measures—a “simple” and a “complex” default premium—to
reduce the likelihood that performance tests would be biased by one, possibly
poor,proxy. Attherootofeachmeasurewasaverageyield—theratioofjumbo
CD interest expense to average balance, computed with Call Report data for
eachbankineachquarter. Toconvertyieldsintosimpledefaultpremiums, we
adjusted for the average maturity of a bank’s jumbo CD portfolio. To obtain
a complex premium series, we used regression analysis to adjust yields for
maturity and nonmaturity factors likely to affect jumbo CD rates.19 Simple
18 Besides measurement error, there are several idiosyncratic aspects of the jumbo CD mar-
ket that might weaken risk pricing. Jumbo CD holders often receive other bank services—loan
commitments and checking accounts, for example—so the issuer might price the relationship com-
prehensively. Another potential explanation is that many jumbo CDs are held by state or local
governments and are, therefore, practically risk-free. (Most states require banks to “pledge” Trea-
sury or agency securities against uninsured public deposits, thereby eliminating all but fraud risk.)
Still another possibility is that many banks no longer fund at the margin with jumbo CDs—these
instruments are now essentially core deposits because of the declining cost of commercial paper
issuance and the increasing availability of Federal Home Loan Bank advances. A ﬁnal, related pos-
sibility is that posted jumbo CD rates are sticky, “clustering” around integers and even fractions
like retail CD rates (Kahn, Pennacchi, and Sopranzetti 1999). These market characteristics may
account for modest risk sensitivities in the yield and runoff regressions. Still, evidence presented
in this section suggests the data contain information about bank condition, thereby satisfying the
necessary condition for jumbo CD risk rankings to add value in surveillance.
19 Default premiums were obtained with maturity and nonmaturity controls from the Call
Report. The reporting convention for maturities changed in the middle of our sample. From
1989 to 1997, the FFIEC required banks to slot jumbo CDs in one of four buckets: “less than
3 months remaining,” “3 months to 1 year remaining,” “1 to 5 years remaining,” and “over 5
years remaining.” In 1997, the two longest maturity buckets became “1 to 3 years remaining”
and “over 3 years remaining.” These maturity measures are crude—jumbo CDs in the shortest
bucket might have been issued years ago—but they offer the only means of controlling for term
structure. We produced simple premiums by ﬁrst multiplying each bank’s jumbo CD balance for
each maturity bucket by that quarter’s yield on Treasuries of comparable maturity. The sum of
the resulting values, divided by average jumbo CD balances, approximated that bank’s risk-free
yield. Simple default premiums for a quarter were then the difference between a bank’s risk-free
yield and its average jumbo CD yield that quarter. Complex premiums controlled for other factors
likely to affect jumbo CD demand or supply. Speciﬁcally, average yields were regressed on average
jumbo CD maturity, maturity-weighted Treasury yield (the portion of a sample bank’s CDs in each
maturity bucket, multiplied by that quarter’s yield on a comparable-maturity Treasury), and the same
nonmaturity controls used in the data-check equations in Section 3. Regression residuals served
as the complex premium series. Carefully controlling in this way for maturity and nonmaturity
inﬂuences on yields should render the resulting default premium series a cleaner measure of default
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and complex default premiums were highly correlated, exhibiting an average
year-by-year correlation coefﬁcient of 0.88.
The second step was generating a deposit-runoff series for all banks with
satisfactory ratings. When signiﬁcant transaction or information frictions are
present,jumboCDholdersareapttowithdrawfundsasfailureprobabilityrises
(Park and Peristiani 1998). Another reason to examine runoff is that a bank’s
demand for jumbo CDs could depend on its condition. Billett, Garﬁnkel,
and O’Neal (1998) and Jordan (2000) have documented a tendency for risky
banking organizations to substitute insured for uninsured deposits to escape
market discipline. If such substitution is important, escalating risk would
show up in declining jumbo CD balances rather than rising default premiums.
To explore these possibilities, we again computed two measures of runoff:




runoff on maturity and nonmaturity factors likely to affect jumbo CD demand
or supply. The correlation coefﬁcient for simple and complex runoff was
35 percent, somewhat less than the correlation between simple and complex
default premiums.
4. THE SURVEILLANCE BENCHMARK—DOWNGRADE
PROBABILITY RANKINGS
Since the 1980s, econometric models have played an important role in bank
surveillance at all three federal supervisory agencies.21 We benchmark the
performance of these models with the CAMELS-downgrade model devel-
oped by Gilbert, Meyer, andVaughan (2002).22 This model is a probit regres-
20 Technically, a positive number implies growth while a negative number implies runoff. To
simplify, we refer to all percentage changes as runoff. By our nomenclature, a bank can experience
positive or negative jumbo CD runoff.
21 Since the early 1990s, the Federal Reserve has relied on two econometric models, collec-
tively known as SEER—the System for Estimating Examination Ratings. One model, the Risk-Rank
model, exploits quarterly Call Report data to estimate the probability of failure over the next two
years. The other model, the Ratings model, produces “shadow” CAMELS ratings—that is, the
composite that would have been assigned had an examination been performed using the latest Call
Report submission. Every quarter, analysts at the Board of Governors feed the data into the SEER
models and forward the results to the Reserve Banks. The surveillance unit at each Bank, in turn,
follows up on ﬂagged institutions. The FDIC and the OCC use similar approaches in off-site
monitoring of the banks they supervise (Reidhill and O’Keefe 1997).
22 The model is discussed in detail here because it is possible in-sample performance has
deteriorated since the Gilbert, Meyer, Vaughan (2002) estimation sample ended in 1996. Such
deterioration would bias performance tests in this research in favor of the jumbo CD rankings. So,
we explain the rationale for the explanatory variables and present evidence of in-sample ﬁt to make
the case that the CAMELS-downgrade model is still a good benchmark for current surveillance
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sion estimating the likelihood a bank with a satisfactory supervisory rating (a
CAMELS1or2composite)willmigratetoanunsatisfactoryrating(a3,4,or5
composite) in the coming eight quarters. Explanatory variables were selected
in 2000 based on a survey of prior research and interviews with safety-and-
soundness examiners. Table 3 describes the independent variables, as well as
the expected relationship between each variable and downgrade risk. Table 5
contains summary statistics for these variables. Most variables are ﬁnancial
performance ratios related to leverage risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk—
three risks that have consistently produced ﬁnancial distress in commercial
banks (Putnam 1983; Cole and Gunther 1998).
We benchmark current surveillance procedures with a CAMELS-
downgrade model. Traditionally, the most popular econometric surveillance
tool has been a failure-prediction model. But failures have been rare since
the early 1990s, preventing re-estimation of these models. Any resulting
“staleness” in coefﬁcients could bias performance tests by compromising the
surveillance benchmark used to assess jumbo CD data. Unlike failures, mi-
gration to unsatisfactory ratings remains common, so a downgrade model can
be updated quarterly. (Table 4 contains 1992–2005 data on downgrade fre-
quency.) Recent research conﬁrms that a CAMELS-downgrade model would
have improved slightly over a failure-prediction model in the 1990s (Gilbert,
Meyer, andVaughan 2002). Even more important, a downgrade model is best
suited to support current supervisory practice. Institutions with unsatisfac-
tory ratings represent signiﬁcant failure risks; supervisors watch them closely
and constantly to ensure progress toward safety and soundness. Most 1- and
2-rated banks, in contrast, are monitored between exams through quarterly
Call Report submissions. As noted, early supervisory intervention improves
chances for arresting ﬁnancial deterioration. So a tool that more accurately
ﬂags deteriorating banks with Call Report data would yield the most surveil-
lance value. These considerations have prompted one Federal Reserve Bank
to “beta test” a CAMELS-downgrade model in routine surveillance and the
Board of Governors to add a downgrade model to the System surveillance
framework in 2006.
The CAMELS-downgrade model relies on six measures of credit risk, the
risk that borrowers will not render promised interest and principal payments.
Thesemeasuresincludetheratioofloans30to89dayspastduetototalassets,
the ratio of loans over 89 days past due to total assets, the ratio of loans in
nonaccrual status to total assets, the ratio of other real estate owned to total
assets (OREO), the ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total assets,
and the ratio of residential real estate loans to total assets. High past-due
and nonaccruing loan ratios increase downgrade probability because, histor-
ically, large portions of these loans have been charged off. OREO consists
primarily of collateral seized after loan defaults, so a high OREO ratio signals
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are backward looking; they register asset quality problems that have already
emerged (Morgan and Stiroh 2001). The ratio of commercial and industrial
loans to total assets is forward looking because, historically, losses on these
loans have been relatively high. The ratio of residential real estate loans to
total assets also provides a forward-looking dimension because, historically,
the loss rate on mortgages has been relatively low. Other things equal, an
increase in dependence on commercial loans or a decrease in dependence on
mortgage loans should translate into greater downgrade risk.
The model contains two measures of leverage risk—the risk that losses
will exceed capital. Measures of leverage risk include the ratio of total equity
(minus goodwill) to total assets and the ratio of net income to average assets
(or, returnonassets). Returnonassetsispartofleverageriskbecauseretained
earningsareanimportantsourceofcapitalformanybanks,andhigherearnings
provide a larger cushion for withstanding adverse economic shocks (Berger
1995). Increases in capital protection or earnings strength should reduce the
probability of migration to an unsatisfactory rating.
Liquidity risk, the risk that loan commitments cannot be funded or
withdrawal demands cannot be met at a reasonable cost, also ﬁgures in the
CAMELS-downgrade model. This risk is captured by two ratios: investment
securities as a percentage of total assets and jumbo CD balances as a per-
centage of total assets. A large stock of liquid assets, such as investment
securities, indicates a strong ability to meet unexpected funding needs and,
therefore, should reduce downgrade probability. Liquidity risk also depends
on a bank’s reliance on non-core funding, or “hot money.” Non-core funding,
which includes jumbo CDs, can be quite sensitive to changes in money mar-
ket rates. Other things equal, greater reliance on jumbo CDs implies greater
likelihoodofafundingrunofforaninterestexpenseshockand, hence, alarger
risk of receiving a 3, 4, or 5 rating in a future exam.
Finally, the model uses three control variables to capture downgrade risks
not strictly associated with current ﬁnancials. These controls include the nat-
ural logarithm of total assets because large banks are better able to reduce risk
by diversifying across product lines and geographic regions. As Demsetz and
Strahan (1997) have noted, however, such diversiﬁcation relaxes a constraint,
enabling bankers to assume more risk, so the ex ante relationship between
asset size and downgrade probability is ambiguous. We also add a dummy
variable for 2-rated banks because they migrate to unsatisfactory status more
often than 1-rated banks. (See Table 4 for supporting evidence.) The list of
control variables rounds out with a dummy for banks with management com-
ponent ratings higher (weaker) than their composite rating. In such banks,
examiners have raised questions about managerial competence, even though
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We estimated the CAMELS-downgrade model for 13 overlapping two-
year windows running from 1990–1991 to 2002–2003.23 Each equation re-
gressed downgrade incidence (1= downgraded, 0= not downgraded) in years
t + 1 and t + 2 on accounting and supervisory data for banks with satisfac-
tory ratings in the fourth quarter of year t. For example, to produce the ﬁrst
equation (1990–1991 in Table 6), downgrade incidence in 1990–1991 was
regressed on 1989:Q4 data for all 1- and 2-rated banks that were not de novos.
We continued with this timing convention, estimating equations year by year,
through a regression of downgrade incidence in 2002–2003 on 2001:Q4 data.
Observations ranged from 6,367 (2002–2003 equation) to 8,682 (1995–1996
equation); the count varied because bank mergers and supervisory reassess-
mentsalteredthenumberofsatisfactoryinstitutionsovertheestimationperiod.
The model ﬁt the data relatively well throughout the estimation sample.
(Table 6 contains the results.)24 The hypothesis that model coefﬁcients jointly
equaled zero could be rejected at the 1 percent level for all 13 equations. The
pseudo-R2, the approximate proportion of variance in downgrade/no down-
grade status explained by the model, was in line with numbers in prior early
warning studies—ranging from 15.0 percent (1994–1995 equation) to 22.6
percent (1991–1992 equation). Estimated coefﬁcients for seven explanatory
variables—the jumbo-CD-to-total-asset ratio, the past due and nonaccruing
loan ratios, the net-income-to-total-asset ratio, and the two supervisor rat-
ing dummies—were statistically signiﬁcant with expected signs in all eight
equations. The coefﬁcient on the logarithm of total assets had a mixed-sign
pattern, which is not surprising given ex ante ambiguity about the relationship
between size and risk. The coefﬁcients on the other six explanatory variables
were statistically signiﬁcant with the expected sign in at least three equations.
Comparingout-of-sampleperformanceofjumboCDanddowngradeprob-
abilityrankingsisnotasbiasedasitmayﬁrstappear. True,jumboCDrankings
draw on one variable—either default premiums or deposit runoffs—while the
downgrade probability rankings draw on 13 variables. But theory suggests
23 Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan (2002) estimated the model for six windows running from
1990–1991 to 1995–1996. We re-estimated the model for these windows because Call Report data
have since been revised, which implies slight changes in coefﬁcients. We also wanted to use
a consistent approach and consistent data for the entire estimation sample to insure subsequent
out-of-sample tests of jumbo CD data were not biased against the surveillance benchmark.
24 This table presents the results of probit regressions of downgrade status on ﬁnancial-
performance ratios and control variables. The dependent variable equals “1” for a downgrade and
“0” for no downgrade in calendar years t+1 and t+2. Values for independent variables are taken
from the fourth quarter of year t. Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefﬁcients.
One asterisk denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-percent level, two at the 5-percent level, and
three at the 1-percent level. The pseudo-R2 indicates the approximate proportion of variance in
downgrade status explained by the model. Overall, the downgrade-prediction model ﬁt the data
well. For all eight regressions, the hypothesis that all model coefﬁcients equal zero could be re-
jected at the 1-percent level of signiﬁcance. In addition, eight of the 13 regression variables are
signiﬁcant with the predicted sign in all eight years, and all variables were signiﬁcant in at least
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premiums and runoff should summarize overall bank risk, not just one type
of exposure such as leverage or credit risk. Put another way, jumbo CD hold-
ers should sift through all available information about the condition of the
issuing bank, note any changes in expected losses, and react to heightened
exposures by demanding higher yields or withdrawing funds. This process
shouldimpoundallrelevantinformation—ﬁnancialaswellasanecdotal—into
default premiums and deposit runoff just as the econometric model impounds
all relevant Call Report data into a CAMELS-downgrade probability.
5. ASSESSING OUT-OF-SAMPLE PERFORMANCE: POWER
CURVEAREAS
We assessed out-of-sample performance using both Type 1 and Type 2 error
rates. Both forecast errors are costly. A missed downgrade to unsatisfactory
status—Type 1 error—is costly because accurate downgrade predictions give
supervisors more warning about emerging problems. A predicted downgrade
thatdoesnotmaterialize—Type2error—iscostlybecauseunwarrantedsuper-
visory intervention wastes scarce examiner resources and disrupts bank oper-
ations. A tradeoff exists between the two errors—supervisors could eliminate
overprediction of downgrades by assuming no banks are at risk of receiving
an unsatisfactory rating in the next two years.
For each risk ranking, it is possible to draw a power curve indicating
the minimum achievable Type 1 error rate for any desired Type 2 error rate
(Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther 1995). For example, tracing the curve for simple
default premium rankings starts by assuming no sample bank is a downgrade
risk. This assumption implies all subsequent downgrades are surprises—a
100 percent Type 1 error rate. Because no banks are incorrectly classiﬁed as
downgrade risks, the Type 2 error rate is zero. The next point on the curve
is obtained by selecting the bank with the highest simple default premium
(maturity-adjusted spread over Treasury). If that bank suffers a downgrade in
the following eight quarters, then theType 1 error rate decreases slightly. The
Type 2 error rate remains zero because, again, no institutions are incorrectly
classiﬁedasdowngraderisks. Iftheselectedbankdoesnotsufferadowngrade,
then the Type 1 error rate remains 100 percent, and the Type 2 error rate
increases slightly. Selecting banks from highest to lowest default premium
and recalculating error rates each time produces a power curve. At the lower
right extreme of the curve, all banks are considered downgrade risks—the
Type 1 error rate is 0 percent, and the Type 2 error rate is 100 percent. Figure
1 illustrates with the power curves for downgrade probability and jumbo CD
rankings for the 1992–1993 test window.
Areas under power curves provide a basis for comparing out-of-sample
performance across risk rankings. The area for each ranking is expressed as a
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Figure 1 How Well Do Jumbo CD and Downgrade Probability






































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Notes: This Figure depicts the power curves for risk rankings based on jumbo CD default
premiums, jumbo CD runoff, and downgrade probabilities (as produced by the CAMELS-
downgrade model) for the 1992–1993 out-of-sample test window. These curves reﬂect
the tradeoff between Type 1 and Type 2 errors. (Type 1 errors are missed downgrades,
and Type 2 errors are overpredicted downgrades.) A convenient way to compare the
performance of risk rankings is to calculate the area under the power curve for each
ranking and express that area as a percentage of the total for the box. Smaller areas are
desired because they imply a simultaneous reduction in both types of errors. The 50-
percent line is the power curve produced when downgrade risks are selected randomly
over a large number of trials. The power curves above show that rankings based on
downgrade probabilities would have signiﬁcantly outperformed rankings based on jumbo
CD default premiums and runoff. Indeed, jumbo CD rankings would not have improved
materially over random rankings.
overall Type 1 and Type 2 error rate and, hence, a more accurate forecast.
The area for a “random-ranking” power curve offers an example as well as a
yardstick for evaluating the economic signiﬁcance of differences in forecast
accuracy. Random selection of downgrade candidates, over a large number
of trials, will produce power curves with an average slope of negative one.
Put another way, the area under the random-ranking power curves, on aver-
age, equals 50 percent of the total area of the box. Power curve areas can be152 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
compared—jumbo CD ranking against downgrade probability rankings or ei-
ther ranking against a random ranking—for any error rate. Assessing forecast
accuracy this way, though somewhat atheoretical, makes best use of existing
data. A more appealing approach would minimize a loss function explicitly
weighingthebeneﬁtsofearlywarningaboutﬁnancialdistressagainstthecosts
of wasted examination resources and unnecessary regulatory burden. Then,
the relative performance of risk rankings could be assessed for the optimal
Type 1 (or Type 2) error rate. The requisite data, however, are not available.
Aspeciﬁcexamplewillclarifythemechanicsofthe“horserace”werunfor
risk rankings. To assess the surveillance value of simple default premiums for
1992–1993,westartbyassumingitisearly1992,justafterfourthquarter1991
data became available. In accordance with standard surveillance procedures,
1990–1991 downgrade incidences are regressed on 1989:Q4 data for the 13
explanatory variables in the CAMELS-downgrade model. Model coefﬁcients
are then applied to 1991:Q4 data to estimate the probability that each 1- and
2-rated bank will migrate to an unsatisfactory condition between 1992:Q1
and 1993:Q4. These banks are then ranked from highest to lowest downgrade
probability. At the same time, all banks with satisfactory supervisory ratings
are ranked from highest to lowest simple default premium (maturity adjusted
spreadoverTreasury),alsousing1991:Q4data,undertheassumptionthathigh
spreads map into high downgrade probabilities. After two years, the record
of missed and overpredicted downgrades is compiled to generate power curve
areas for each ranking. A smaller area for the downgrade probability ranking
would imply that simple default premiums added no surveillance value in the
1992–1993 test window.
6. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Downgrade Model Rankings and Jumbo CD
Rankings—Full-Sample Results
The evidence suggests jumbo CD default premiums would have contributed
nothing to bank surveillance between 1992 and 2005 when used to forecast
downgrades two years out. (Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 7 contain the
relevant power curve areas.) Over the 13 test windows, the average area
underthesimpledefaultpremiumpowercurve(45.63percent)andtheaverage
area under the complex default premium power curve (49.70 percent) did not
differ statistically or economically from the random-ranking benchmark (50
percent). Incontrast,theaverageareaunderthedowngrademodelpowercurve
(19.66 percent) came to less than half of that benchmark. Power curve areas
for individual two-year test windows showed the same patterns. Speciﬁcally,
downgrade model areas ranged from 15.24 percent (1996–1997) to 22.39
percent (1994–1995); simple default premium areas ran from 41.56 percent
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areas varied from 45.69 percent (1998–1999) to 52.20 percent (1992–1993).
The poor performance of jumbo CD rankings relative to downgrade model
rankings suggests default premiums would not have ﬂagged banks missed
by conventional surveillance. The poor performance relative to the random-
selection benchmark suggests default premiums would not have increased
supervisor conﬁdence about rankings produced by the CAMELS-downgrade
model.
Out-of-sample performance of risk rankings based on jumbo CD runoff
was no better. (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 contain the relevant power curve
areas.) The average area for simple runoff rankings across all test windows
was 46.12 percent while the average for complex runoff was 50.47 percent—
again,statisticallyandeconomicallyindistinguishablefromrandomselection.
And once again, patterns were consistent across individual two-year test win-
dows. Powercurveareasforsimplerunoffrankingsvariedfrom43.56percent
(1999–2000)to49.54percent(1992–1993),areasundercomplexrunoffcurves
from 45.75 percent (1998–1999) to 53.08 percent (1992–1993). This consis-
tently poor performance suggests runoff rankings would not have helped spot
downgrade risks two years out between 1992 and 2005.
Changing forecast horizons did not alter the results. Over 13 one-year
windows, downgrade model rankings produced an average power curve area
of 17.37 percent (standard deviation across test windows of 2.39 percent).
In contrast, simple default premium rankings produced an average area of
45.38 percent (standard deviation of 2.95 percent) and complex default pre-
mium rankings, an average area of 50.29 percent (standard deviation of 3.26
percent). Areas for runoff rankings were even closer to the random-ranking
benchmark—46.79 percent on average for simple runoff (standard deviation
across the 13 windows of 2.47 percent) and 50.87 percent for complex runoff
(standard deviation of 3.45 percent). Lengthening the forecast horizon to
three years yielded similar numbers. This evidence goes to the timeliness
of information in jumbo CD rankings. As noted, market data could enhance
surveillance by ﬂagging problems before existing tools. But, between 1992
and 2005, jumbo CD data would not have improved over random selection
at any forecasting horizon, much less current surveillance procedures. Put
another way, feedback from the jumbo CD market would not have provided
supervisors with earlier warning about developing problems.
Jumbo CD rankings constructed from both default premiums and runoff
did not improve over random selection, either. In theory, price and quantity
signals from the jumbo CD market, though weak when used singly, could
jointly capture useful information about future bank condition. If so, a model
relying only on multiple signals could add value—even if performance rel-
ative to the benchmark was poor—by reducing supervisor uncertainty about
banks ﬂagged by conventional surveillance. We explored this possibility by
estimating a downgrade model with (1) only simple default premiums and154 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
runoff as explanatory variables and (2) only complex default premiums and
runoff as explanatory variables. Out-of-sample performance was then tested
over a variety of forecasting horizons for 1992–2005. Columns 7 and 8 in
Table 7 contain the results for two-year windows; they are representative.
Over all 13 tests, the power curve area for the bivariate “simple” model av-
eraged 45.55 percent (standard deviation across individual windows of 2.49
percent) and 50.05 percent for the bivariate “complex” model (standard devi-
ation of 2.99 percent). Further perspective can be gained by comparing these
numbers to power curve areas produced by a “pared down” model including
only the dummy variables in the baseline CAMELS-downgrade model. The
average power curve area for this model across the 13 two-year windows was
30.07 percent. Taken together, this evidence suggests jumbo CD data would
nothavereducedsupervisoryuncertaintyaboutbanksﬂaggedbyconventional
surveillance tools.
Downgrade Model Rankings and Jumbo CD
Rankings—Sub-Sample Results
Although jumbo CD risk rankings would not have contributed to general
surveillance of 1- and 2-rated banks, default premiums and runoff might im-
prove monitoring of speciﬁc cohorts such as banks with short jumbo CD
portfolios, large asset portfolios, no foreign deposits, low capital ratios, or
signiﬁcant “deposits at risk.”
The marginal-average problem noted earlier could in part account for the
weak performance of default premium rankings. As an arithmetic matter,
today’s average yield will be more representative of today’s risk levels if
jumbo CD maturities are short. To explore this possibility, we replicated all
out-of-sample tests described earlier in Section 6 on a sub-sample of banks
with weighted-average portfolio maturities under six months. The results did
not change. At the two-year horizon, for example, the average area under
complex default premium power curves was 42.97 percent. At the one-year
horizon, the average area was 42.30 percent. Put simply, long jumbo CD
maturities do not account for the poor performance of default premiums.
The jumbo CD market might emit stronger risk signals for large, com-
plex banking organizations. Jumbo CDs at community banks may be more
like core deposits than money market instruments. And because prices and
quantities of core deposits are known to be sticky (Flannery 1982), yields and
runoff of community bank jumbos could respond sluggishly to changes in
risk no matter how short the maturity of the portfolio. Another reason large
bank signals may be more informative is that monitoring costs for their unin-
sured depositors are lower—these institutions have publicly traded securities
and are closely followed by market analysts. To test for an asset-threshold
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of banks holding more than the median level of assets. Out-of-sample re-
sults for this sub-sample were qualitatively similar to the results from the full
sample. Across the 13 two-year test windows, for example, the area under
the simple default premium power curves averaged 44.90 percent (compared
with 45.63 percent for the full sample). We also tested risk rankings for banks
holding more than $1 billion in assets and for banks with SEC registrations.
Each time, we compared results from the large bank sub-sample with results
from the remaining sub-sample (i.e., banks holding less than median assets,
banks holding less than $1 billion in assets, and banks with no SEC regis-





of banks with no foreign deposits. The National Depositor PreferenceAct of
1993elevatedclaimsofdomesticdepositorsoverclaimsofforeigndepositors,
reducing expected losses for jumbo CD holders (Marino and Bennett 1999).
DomesticholdersofjumboCDsissuedbybankswithforeignofﬁcesmayhave
perceived no default-risk exposure because of the ﬁnancial cushion provided
by foreign deposits. To test for a depositor-preference effect, we screened
out banks with foreign deposits and replicated all out-of-sample tests. Again,
the results mirrored the full-sample results; for example, for the two-year test
windows, the average power curve area under the simple default premium
rankings was 45.70 percent, virtually unchanged from the full sample (45.63
percent). Evenforbankswithnoforeign-depositcushion,jumboCDrankings
contained no useful supervisory information.
Finally, thejumboCDmarketmightyieldcluesaboutemergingproblems
in banks with high levels of uninsured deposits or low levels of capital. In
theory,jumboCDholderswithmoreexposure—eitherbecausetheiruninsured
balances are high or bank capital levels are low—have greater incentive to
monitor and discipline risk. So we produced rankings for the quartile of
sample banks with the largest volume of “deposits at risk” and the quartile
with the lowest ratios of equity-to-assets (adjusted for bank size). Again,
default premium and runoff rankings did not improve over random selection,
much less conventional surveillance. As a ﬁnal check, we looked at various
intersections of the sub-samples—banks with high deposits at risk and low
capital,bankswithnoforeigndepositsand shortjumboCDmaturities,etc. We
generatedrankingsbasedondefaultpremiums,depositrunoff,andbothdefault
premiums and deposit runoff. The results across all tests were consistent—
jumbo CD rankings did not improve materially over random rankings at any
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Default Premiums and Runoff as Regressors in the
Downgrade Model
Although default premium and runoff perform poorly as independent risk
signals,theycouldaddvalueasregressorsintheCAMELS-downgrademodel.
Indeed, previous research has identiﬁed surveillance ratios with this property
(Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan 1999). To pursue this angle, we estimated an
“enhanced” CAMELS-downgrade model, adding both simple and complex
measures of premiums and runoff to the 13 baseline explanatory variables.
As before, out-of-sample performance was gauged by impact on power curve
areas—ﬁrst when default premiums and runoff were added to the baseline
model and then when these variables were dropped from the enhanced model.
As a further check, we assessed performance with the quadratic probability
score (QPS)—a probit analogue for root mean square error (Estrella 1998;
Estrella and Mishkin 1998).25 If default premiums and runoff enhance the
CAMELS-downgrade model, removing them from the enhanced model will
boost QPS. Columns 9 and 10 in Table 7 contain power curve areas for the
simple and complex enhancements of the downgrade model. Column 2 of
panel A in Table 8 notes the impact of the two simple jumbo CD series on
powercurveareas;column2ofpanelBinTable8showstheimpactoftheseries
on QPS. (Results for complex default premiums and runoff are not reported
because they mirror results for the simple series.) To facilitate interpretation,
we note the impact on QPS and power curve areas of other variable blocks—
such as the leverage-risk variables (equity-to-asset ratio and return on assets)
and control variables (log of total assets, dummy for composite rating of 2,
and dummy for management component rating weaker than the composite
rating)—in columns 3 through 6 of panels A and B in Table 8. In Table 6,
changes in QPS and power curve areas are expressed in percentage-change
terms to permit direct comparison.
In performance tests for 1992–2005, default premiums and runoff did
not enhance the CAMELS-downgrade model. Adding simple versions of the





(increased average QPS by 0.06 percent). The leverage-risk variables provide
25 To obtain QPS, we ﬁrst computed downgrade probability for each sample bank with the
CAMELS-downgrade model. Then, we subtracted Rt—a binary variable equal to one if the bank
was downgraded in the out-of-sample window and zero if not—from the downgrade probability
estimate. Finally, we squared the difference, multiplied the result by two, and averaged across
all sample banks. An ideal model generates probabilities close to unity for banks with subsequent
downgrades and probabilities close to zero for non-downgrades, so higher QPS ﬁgures imply weaker
out-of-sample performance, just as higher power curve areas imply weaker performance.R.A. Gilbert,A. P. Meyer, and M. D. Vaughan: Jumbo CD Market 157
some perspective on the economic signiﬁcance of these changes—dropping
bothofthemincreasedthepowercurvearea(worsenedperformance)byanav-
erage of 5.20 percent and increased the average QPS (worsened performance)
by an average of 2.03 percent. These results held up in tests on the various
sample cuts and forecasting horizons described in the previous subsections.
7. DISCUSSION
It is possible that some combination of measurement error and idiosyncrasies
in the jumbo CD market accounts for our results. These factors may not be
important enough to remove all evidence of risk pricing from jumbo CD data,
but they may be important enough to prevent risk rankings based on the data
from imparting valuable surveillance information.
But data problems and market frictions are unlikely to explain away the
ﬁndings. As noted, recent studies using actual debt and equity market data
rather than accounting proxies have found only modest surveillance value
in market signals. Rather, the economic environment since the early 1990s
probably plays an important role. Over this period, bank proﬁtability and
capital ratios soared to record highs. Some economists attribute these trends
to an unprecedented economic boom that allowed banks to reap the upside
of expansions into risky new markets and product lines (Berger et al. 2000).
Others argue that stakeholders of large complex banking organizations in-
sisted on greater capital cushions because of increasingly sophisticated risk
exposures (Flannery and Rangan 2002). In such a high-proﬁt, high-capital
environment, jumbo CD signals—no matter how accurately measured or pre-
cisely determined—would convey little information because the beneﬁts of
monitoring are so low. Such an explanation would account for the successful
use of average yields in bank-risk studies on data from the 1980s—a time
when ﬁnancial distress was fairly common and failures were sharply rising.
Such an explanation would also account for the evidence in Martinez-Peria
and Schmukler (2001). With a data set and research strategy similar to ours,
they studied the impact of banking crises on market discipline in Argentina,
Chile, and Mexico, ﬁnding little discipline before, but signiﬁcant discipline
after, the crises.
8. CONCLUSION
The evidence suggests that feedback from the jumbo CD market would have
added no value in bank surveillance between 1992 and 2005. Throughout
the decade, risk rankings produced by a CAMELS downgrade—a model cho-
sen to benchmark current surveillance practices—would have signiﬁcantly
outperformed risk rankings based on default premiums and runoff. More-
over, jumbo CD rankings would have improved little over random orderings.158 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Finally, adding jumbo CD signals to the downgrade model would not have
improved its out-of-sample performance. These results hold up for a variety
of sample cuts and forecast horizons. Taken together, these results imply that
the marginal surveillance value of jumbo CD signals is less than the marginal
production cost—even if that cost is very low.
Our results carry mixed implications for proposals to incorporate market
data more formally into bank supervision. On the one hand, the evidence sug-
gestsavailablejumboCDdatawoulddolittletoenhancesurveillance,thereby
clearing the way for experimentation with other, “purer” market signals. On
the other hand, if the “unique sample period” explanation for our results is
true, then it is likely the surveillance value of signals from the market for bank
debt and equity will vary over time. Other things equal, such time variation
would lower the net beneﬁt of integrating market data into current surveil-
lance routines. Interpreted in this light, our ﬁndings imply that future policy
and research work on market data should focus on identifying the speciﬁc
bank claims that yield the most surveillance value in each state of the busi-
ness cycle. Put another way, our ﬁndings—when viewed with other recent
research—suggest the supervisory return from reliance on a single market
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Table 2 Do Jumbo CD Data Contain Evidence of Risk Pricing?
Evidence from Regressions ofYields and Runoff on Failure
Probabilities
Sensitivity of Jumbo CD Yields and Runoff to Failure Probability
1988: Q1–2004:Q4
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Yields Runoff
Independent Variable Coefﬁcient (Std. Error) Coefﬁcient (Std. Error)
Failure Probability 0.0108*** -0.3309***
(Lagged One Quarter) (0.0038) (0.0505)
Maturity-Weighted Treasury Yield 0.6878*** 0.5324
(0.0391) (0.5211)
Average Portfolio Maturity 0.0820*** -1.8743***
(0.0209) (0.2785)
Maturity-Treasury Interactive -0.0140*** -0.3408*
(0.0147) (0.1959)
Holding Company Dummy -0.0595 -0.9042***
(0.0136) (0.1808)
Brokered Deposit Dummy 0.1403*** -0.0868
(0.0270) (0.3592)
MSA Dummy 0.1384*** 1.7813
(0.0913) (1.2164)
R2 0.2288 0.0125
F-statistic Control Variables 394.16*** 33.25***
F-statistic Time Dummies 155.69*** 21.88***
F-statistic State Dummies 21.53*** 15.21***
Observations 229,486 229,486
Notes: This table reports results for regressions of jumbo CD yields and runoff on failure
probabilities and various controls. Equations were estimated on a sub-sample of banks
with satisfactory CAMELS ratings. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-
(*), 5- (**), and 1- (***) percent levels. A positive and signiﬁcant failure-probability
coefﬁcient in the yield equation and/or a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in the runoff
equation constitute evidence that bank condition is priced. The results indicate that greater
risk of failure translates, on average, into higher yields and larger runoff, suggesting that
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Table 5 Selected Summary Statistics—Jumbo CD Data and
Regressors for the CAMELS-Downgrade Model
Standard
Variable Median Mean Deviation
Credit Risk PAST DUE 30 0.68 0.90 0.84
PAST DUE 90 0.07 0.21 0.39
NONACCRUING 0.19 0.38 0.56
OREO 0.03 0.20 0.46
COMMERICAL 7.65 9.28 6.97
RESIDENTIAL 14.26 15.91 10.68
Leverage Risk NET WORTH 8.84 9.79 4.74
ROA 1.17 1.23 2.05
Liquidity Risk SECURITIES 28.65 30.41 14.87
JUMBO CDs 8.00 9.33 6.56
Controls SIZE 11.07 11.21 1.29
CAMELS-2 1.00 0.61 0.49
MANAGEMENT 0.00 0.18 0.39
“Simple” Default Premium 0.47 0.42 2.83
“Complex” Default Premium NA NA 2.18
“Simple” Deposit Runoff 9.39 19.25 52.02
“Complex” Default Premium NA NA 33.03
Notes: This table contains summary statistics for the independent variables used in the
CAMELS-downgrade prediction model, computed over all year-end regression observa-
tions from 1989 to 2001. Summary statistics for the default premiums and deposit runoff
series used in jumbo CD risk rankings are also provided for comparison. The “complex”
measures of premium and runoff are regression residuals, so means and medians are not
meaningful, but standard deviations are roughly in line with their “simple” counterparts.
The correlation coefﬁcients between the “simple” and “complex” measures are 88 percent
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